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Abstract— Malicious web domains represent a big threat to 
web users’ privacy and security. With so much freely available 
data on the Internet about web domains’ popularity and 
performance, this study investigated the performance of well-
known machine learning techniques used in conjunction with 
this type of online data to identify malicious web domains. Two 
datasets consisting of malware and phishing domains were 
collected to build and evaluate the machine learning classifiers. 
Five single classifiers and four ensemble classifiers were 
applied to distinguish malicious domains from benign ones. In 
addition, a binary particle swarm optimisation (BPSO) based 
feature selection method was used to improve the performance 
of single classifiers. Experimental results show that, based on 
the web domains’ popularity and performance data features, 
the examined machine learning techniques can accurately 
identify malicious domains in different ways. Furthermore, the 
BPSO-based feature selection procedure is shown to be an 
effective way to improve the performance of classifiers. 
Keywords—Malicious web domains; web security; 
classification; machine learning; feature selection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The increased popularity and widespread use of Internet 
has made e-marketing an efficient way to promote products 
and services online. These days, organisations often share 
information about their products or services via email and 
social media. With an insurmountable amount of information 
from e-marketing, attacks through malicious URLs that trick 
an email recipient to an illegitimate site have become a 
common threat to web users’ privacy and security. Two main 
types of malicious attacks are phishing attacks that deceive 
users into sharing passwords and their private information, as 
well as malware attacks that secretly access and infect users’ 
computers by distributing viruses and malicious software. 
Malicious attacks can cause not just financial loss and 
privacy violation but also shatter the trust of web users in 
conducting e-commerce and online social activities, thereby 
indirectly affecting the effectiveness of e-marketing. To 
protect users from malicious attacks, a typical way is to 
prevent users from visiting malicious online links by 
providing timely warning against accessing content on 
malicious web domains. Being able to accurately identify 
malicious web domains has therefore become a matter of 
paramount importance. 
Over the years, many anti-phishing toolbars [1, 2] have 
been developed, primarily by maintaining a user-verified 
blacklist. This technique detects phishing web domains by 
comparing the web domain a user visits with phishing web 
domains collected in the blacklist. However, due to the rapid 
increase of phishing web domains over time, it is not only 
challenging but almost impossible to maintain a perfect 
blacklist. Some studies have investigated and confirmed the 
ineffectiveness of various blacklist-based security toolbars in 
identifying phishing web domains (e.g., see [3]).  
A more effective way to tackle the issue is through the 
use of machine learning. Many popular machine learning 
techniques have been successfully applied to identify 
phishing websites based on data features extracted from the 
sites. For example, Blum et al. [4] developed confidence-
weighted classification for phishing URL detection based on 
lexical features. Ma et al. [5, 6] created classification 
algorithms to detect malicious URLs by looking at the 
lexical and host-based properties of suspicious URLs. Garera 
et al. [7] identified features from URLs to model a logistic 
regression classifier in order to distinguish a phishing URL 
from benign ones. In addition to lexical and host-based 
features, some studies also extracted features from web page 
content and used the features to train machine learning 
algorithms for malicious site identification [8-11]. For 
instance, Ludl et al. [12] investigated the feasibility of using 
properties of a web page, such as images, texts and links, to 
identify phishing pages based on decision trees. While these 
techniques have shown to have good accuracies in detecting 
phishing sites, they require extraction of features and 
comparison between the benign and malicious sites, which 
can be a tedious process.  
For the drive-by-download type of (malware) attacks, a 
common way is to detect signatures of malicious sites by 
reviewing their code either manually or automatically. 
Although doing so can be simple and straightforward, it is 
sometimes ineffective as the code review process could be 
easily evaded by obfuscated code. Thus, researchers have 
turned to machine learning techniques for overcoming the 
problem by applying features extracted from the content or 
code of malicious web pages to build identification models. 
Canali et al. [10], for instance, proposed a filter called 
Prophiler to extract features from content of a page as well 
as from URLs, and from there they derived detection models 
with machine learning techniques for malicious site 
identification. Curtsinger et al. [13] proposed a Bayesian-
based model using features of Javascript to identify syntax 
elements of malware sites. Similar to the identification of 
phishing web domains with content-based features, these 
approaches could be cumbersome as features need to be 
extracted and analysed from web content.  
Given that different kinds of metrics for web domains are 
freely available and can be used to evaluate their credibility, 
this paper investigates the performance of machine learning 
techniques based on this type of widely available Internet 
data (i.e., the popularity and performance of web domains) to 
identify malicious web domains. In total, we consider 16 
data features (see Section IV.A for details) and nine machine 
learning models, which include both single classifiers and 
ensemble models (see Sections III.A and III.B). To reduce 
the computational burden and further improve the 
performance of identification, a binary particle swarm 
optimisation (BPSO) based feature selection technique is 
implemented for the single classifiers to select a subset of the 
features rather than applying all of them (see Section III.C). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
reviews related studies in the area. In Section III, we describe 
the machine learning models and feature selection technique 
used. Experimental settings and results with discussions are 
presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this 
study with highlights of future research directions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of studies in the literature have employed 
machine learning techniques to identify phishing websites. 
Ludl et al. [12] performed a study on the effectiveness of 
anti-phishing solutions using blacklists. They also 
investigated the feasibility of using properties of a web page, 
such as images, texts and links, to identify phishing pages. 
Two major findings from this study are 1) blacklist-based 
solutions are actually quite effective in protecting users from 
phishing, and 2) web page properties can be used to identify 
phishing. Ludl et al. used a total of 18 data features from web 
pages in their classification analysis. Xiang et al. [8, 9] 
proposed Cantina+, a feature-rich machine learning 
framework that adopts the HTML Document Object Model 
and search engine features to detect phishing sites. Cantina+ 
first applies two filters, i.e., hash-based and login form filters, 
to filter near-duplicate phishing websites. If a website is not 
identified as a phishing site by these filters, Cantina+ then 
tests the website using machine learning techniques with a 
total of 15 features. These features include URL, HTML and 
search engine based features. An additional feature, a domain 
top-page similarity feature, was later added to Cantina+ by 
Sanglerdsinlapachai and Rungsawang [14]. Whittaker et al. 
[15] developed a scalable machine learning classifier to 
maintain Google’s phishing blacklist. Their system classifies 
web pages that are submitted by end users and/or collected 
from Gmail’s spam filters. Similar to Cantina+, the proposed 
system adopts URL and HTML features. To reduce the 
number of features used by their machine learning software, 
the system only uses features of terms with the highest Term 
Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) values 
[16]. TF-IDF can be calculated based on the frequency of a 
term in a given page divided by the log of the frequency of 
the term in all pages.  
In addition to employing machine learning techniques for 
phishing site identification, other methods exist. For example, 
Aburrous et al. [17] employed fuzzy logic to intelligently 
detect phishing websites. Wardman & Warner [18] proposed 
a novel idea that uses a hashing algorithm MD5 to identify 
phishing websites. They considered MD5 values of 
additional files found on a website (e.g., .js, .css, .jpg, .gif) 
for phish identification, with the assumption that many 
phishers would re-use the same files to create phishing 
websites. A similar assumption was made by Layton et al. 
[19], who proposed the use of Diffs to increase the ability of 
clustering algorithms to discover the differences between a 
phishing web page and the actual web page that is being 
impersonated. Fu et al. [20] used the earth mover’s distance 
to measure the similarity of web page visual in identifying 
phishing web pages. They first converted images from a web 
page into low resolution images and used them as image 
signatures. After that, signature similarities between benign 
and phishing webpages were evaluated and malicious ones 
identified. Zhang et al. [11] presented a similar approach but 
considered both visual and textual contents, and applied a 
Bayesian classifier to detect phishing web pages. Liu et al. 
[21] used clustering of associated web pages to detect 
whether a given web page is a phishing page or not. A major 
issue with these methods is that they require processing of 
the original web page as a base comparison. This not only 
affects the system performance when detecting phishing web 
pages, but more importantly they require legitimate web 
pages as inputs given by the users. This brings doubts to the 
practicality of these methods, as some web domains may be 
unknown to the users.   
Apart from phishing sites, various web domains and 
pages also perform malicious acts by distributing malware. 
Malware propagations are mostly in a stealth mode, where 
malicious programs would be downloaded to users’ 
machines without their consent. This type of attacks is 
normally named as drive-by-download attack. An effective 
mitigation strategy is to detect an attack prior to loading a 
web domain or web page. This is typically done by 
reviewing the web code either manually or automatically, 
with the aim to identify malicious signatures. However, 
hackers are smart in obfuscating code to evade the code 
review process. Various studies that have employed machine 
learning techniques to detect drive-by download attacks exist. 
Cova et al. [22] introduced Wepawet, an online service that 
performs dynamic analysis on the web code using machine 
learning techniques. The dynamic analysis involves running 
the code in a sandboxed environment to record its behaviour. 
A machine learning algorithm is then trained to classify 
malicious sites. Canali et al. extended Wepawet with 
Prophiler [10] that performs quick static analysis using 
extracted features from the content of a web page with a 
decision tree algorithm. Rieck et al. [23] proposed Cujo, an 
automatic system that uses Support Vector Machines (SVMs) 
to detect drive-by-download attacks. Cujo performs both 
static and dynamic analyses after lexical tokens are extracted 
from the web code. Cujo uses similar features used by 
Wepawet and Prophiler. Curtsinger et al. [13] proposed 
Zozzle, an in-browser malware detection method. Zozzle 
uses Bayesian classification of hierarchical features of 
Javascript to identify syntax elements of malware. In 
addition to drive-by-download malware detection, several 
methods have been proposed to detect malware in a system. 
For example, Dinaburg et al. [24] proposed Ether, an 
analyser that uses hardware virtualisation extensions to 
analyse malware. Dinaburg et al. claimed that Ether remains 
transparent and does not induce any side effects that are 
unconditionally detectable by malware, as it resides outside 
of the target operating system environment. Other methods 
proposed to identify and analyse malware affecting system 
components include Justin [25] and PolyUnPack [26].  
As can be seen from the review of related work presented, 
phishing and malware attacks are great threats to web users’ 
privacy and security. While many studies in the literature 
have developed different kinds of approaches for identifying 
phishing and malware domains separately, we consider 
dealing with both attacks at the same time as crucial by 
building classification models with freely available phishing 
and malware related data features. To the best of our 
knowledge, our work is among the first in attempting to 
classify phishing and malware domains simultaneously. 
III. MODELS 
In this section, we present the machine learning models 
used for comparison purposes. We first describe the single 
and ensemble models, and then explain how BPSO-based 
feature selection is incorporated into the single classifiers. 
A. Single Models 
 An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a 
computational system composed of interconnected 
neurons, which exchange messages between each 
other [27]. A typical architecture of ANN consists of 
three layers: an input layer, which corresponds to the 
input features; an output layer, which denotes the 
response or output of the model; and a hidden layer 
that sits in between the input and output layers. To 
generate the final classifier that minimises the 
empirical errors, the network is trained by tuning the 
weight between each pair of connections. 
 An SVM implements the structural risk minimisation 
principle by minimising an upper bound to the 
generalisation error [28]. The concept is to construct 
an optimal separating hyperplane in a high-
dimensional feature space by maximising the margin 
between the hyperplane and the closest points of any 
class. This leads to excellent generalisation 
performance of SVM, which has been widely and 
successfully applied in many areas (e.g., see [29-31]).  
 C4.5, introduced by Quinlan [32], is an algorithm 
that creates classifiers by building decision trees. It 
builds a tree from a dataset using the divide-and-
conquer strategy. In case all samples of a set belong 
to the same class or the set is small, each leaf of the 
tree is labelled with the most frequent label. 
Otherwise, C4.5 chooses a feature with the highest 
gain ratio to split the dataset.  
 K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) classifies an unlabelled 
sample based on the k-nearest samples by assuming 
that those samples with similar properties will exist in 
close proximity [33]. The most frequent class label 
among the k-nearest neighbours is the predicted class 
label for the unlabelled sample. 
 Naïve Bayes is a linear probabilistic classifier based 
on the Bayes theorem [34] with a simple assumption 
that each pair of features is independent given the 
context of the class. Although this assumption is 
clearly ‘naïve’ in most real-world applications, Naïve 
Bayes has worked quite well in many tasks such as 
document classification and spam filtering [35, 36].  
B. Ensemble Models 
An ensemble approach typically combines a number of 
weak learners so that a strong learner with higher accuracy 
can be produced. Many studies, both theoretical and 
empirical, have shown that an ensemble of individual 
classifiers could outperform a single classifier (e.g., see [37, 
38]). In this study, four well-known ensemble models are 
considered. They are briefly described as follows. 
 Bagging (also known as bootstrap aggregation) 
constructs a set of weak learners by bootstrapping the 
samples [39]. Specifically, by taking many samples 
from the original dataset, bagging builds a separate 
classifier on each bootstrapped sample and generates 
the final classifier based on a majority vote strategy. 
Bagging can dramatically reduce the variance of 
weak learners like decision trees and lead to 
improved performance. 
 Adaboost, which stands for Adaptive Boost, is one of 
the most prominent members of the Boost method 
[37]. Similar to bagging, Adaboost constructs a set of 
weak learners by manipulating the samples. Unlike 
bagging, which builds each learner on the 
bootstrapped sample independently, Adaboost is 
adaptive in the sense that each weak learner is built 
sequentially. By maintaining a set of adaptive weights, 
the subsequent learner pays more attention to those 
instances misclassified by previous classifiers. A 
composited classifier is generated by aggregating the 
weak learners through a weighted voting mechanism 
on the basis of their accuracy. 
 Random Forest (RF), introduced by Breiman [40], is 
an improved version of bagging. It consists of many 
decision trees built on bootstrapped samples. The 
difference is that each decision tree is built with 
randomly selected subsets of features rather than the 
entire feature set as in bagging. The strategy of 
random selection of features enforces diversity 
without compromising the accuracy of individual 
learners, thus RF is able to improve the performance 
of bagging. 
 The Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM) [41] 
improves boosting [37] as a method for function 
estimation from the perspective of optimisation. In a 
GBM, the learning procedure sequentially builds new 
base-learners with maximum gradient descent of the 
loss function. 
C. BPSO-based Feature Selection 
Among the collected features (see Section IV.A) in this 
study, some may be less relevant or highly redundant 
compared to others. The presence of those features not only 
increases complexity but can decrease classification 
performance. Using feature selection to eliminate irrelevant 
and redundant features without decreasing the performance 
of a model is thus desirable (e.g., see [42-44]). BPSO [45], 
an efficient swarm intelligence technique, has been 
successfully used for feature selection in many classification 
problems (e.g., see [46, 47]). With this in mind, we apply it 
to the five single models described in Section III.A in order 
to improve their performance in identifying malicious web 
domains.  
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Fig. 1. A flowchart of BPSO-based feature selection 
Fig. 1 shows the process of BPSO-based feature selection. 
An individual here is represented by a binary string 
corresponds to a feature subset. The length of each binary 
string equals to the number of available features, and a bit 
with the value of 1 (or 0) in the binary string denotes that the 
corresponding feature is selected (or excluded). To evaluate 
the fitness of an individual, a specific classifier is trained and 
the classification performance is calculated. In this study, for 
different classifiers with BPSO-based feature selection, the 
corresponding classifier is applied to calculate the fitness of 
an individual. By simulating social behaviour of birds 
flocking to a near-optimal position through interactions with 
others, the BPSO-based feature selection method can find a 
subset of features with improved performance for a specific 
classifier. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
A. Data Preparation 
The objective of this paper is to improve the performance 
of machine learning in accurately identifying malicious web 
domains based on their popularity and performance. For this 
purpose, we collected malicious and benign live Internet web 
domains. Specifically, two datasets, one with malware only 
(Malware) and the other with both malware and phishing 
(MalwarePhishing) domains were collected to build and 
evaluate the classifiers. Each dataset consists of 2000 live 
Internet domains valid as at 31 July 2015. To eliminate the 
data imbalance issue, both datasets contain an equal amount 
of malicious and benign web domains. Out of the 1000 
benign web domains, 250 records (25%) are popular web 
domains listed in the Alexa’s top 500 Global Sites [48]. 
Malware web domains in the Malware dataset were obtained 
from MalwareDomain’s blocklist [49] while phishing web 
domains in the combined MalwarePhishing dataset were 
obtained from PhishTank’s blocklist [50]. Among the 
malware web domains are malware propagation domains, 
attackers’ exploit domains, ransomware domains and high 
risk domains. Legitimate domains that are infected by 
malware or known to distribute them have also been 
included in the dataset. A data label, named 
“WebDomainLabel”, is used to determine whether a web 
domain record is malicious or not.  
In total, 16 data features were collected and used in the 
datasets. These data features are all in numerical values. A 
summary of the 16 data features is provided below: 
1) Moz’s Domain Authority denotes Moz’s prediction [51] 
of how a website will perform in search engine 
rankings. 
2) MozRank is a logarithmically scaled 10-point measure 
of global link popularity by Moz. 
3) Moz’s total backlinks represent the number of external 
backlinks received by a web domain. The more 
backlinks a web domain receives, the more popular the 
web domain is on the Internet. 
4) Majestic’s Citation Flow is a citation ranking given by 
Majestic SEO [52] that shows how influential a web 
domain is on the Internet based on citations by other 
domains. 
5) Majestic’s Trust Flow is a trust ranking given by 
Majestic SEO that shows how close those citations are 
to the trustworthy sources. 
6) Majestic’s backlinks represent the total number of 
external backlinks received by a web domain. 
7) Majestic’s reference domains represent the total 
number of external web domains that refer to a 
particular web domain.  
8) Three data features from social authority metrics 
including 
a) total shares in Facebook,  
b) the total number of Twitter tweets, and  
c) the total number of +1 in Google plus.  
Social authority metrics enable us to find out the 
popularity of a web domain in various social network 
sites. The higher the social authority metric, the more 
popular the web domain is. 
9) Google’s Page Rank is a metric developed by Google 
that is used to rank web domains in Google’s search 
engine results. 
10) Google’s Page Speed is a speed metric that shows the 
performance of a web domain to load.  
11) Alexa’s rank is a ranking given by Alexa that shows 
the popularity of a web domain on the Internet solely 
based on the number of visitors accessing the web 
domain. The higher the number of visitors, the more 
popular the web domain is. 
12) Alexa’s 1-month reach is the metric showing daily 
unique visitors in a one-month period.  
13) Alexa’s 3-month reach is the metric showing daily 
unique visitors in a three-month period. 
14) Alexa’s median load is the median load time of a web 
domain based on Alexa’s survey with its proprietary 
algorithms.  
 
Note that data obtained from these Internet sources may 
change or be updated over time, as web domains may gain or 
lose popularity and performance. It is therefore imperative to 
show the time-stamp of the collected data in our datasets. To 
avoid features in greater numeric ranges dominating those in 
smaller numeric ranges, all features have been scaled to the 
range of [0,1]. 
B. Evaluation Metrics 
For binary classification tasks such as to determine if a 
web domain is benign or malicious (malware or phishing 
ones), the performance of a classifier can be measured by 
using a confusion matrix (see Table I). As the cost of 
misclassifying a malicious web domain is much higher than 
that of a benign domain, “malicious” is labelled as the 
positive class. As can be seen in Table I, TP is the number of 
correctly classified malicious domains, TN is the number of 
correctly classified benign domains, FP is the number of 
predicted malicious domains that are actually benign ones, 
and FN is the number of wrongly classified benign domains 
that are actually malicious ones. Based on these four metrics, 
the performance of classification can be evaluated by the 
following measures: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F-
measure. They are defined as follows: 
 TP TNAccuracy
TP TN FP FN
      (1) 
 TPPrecision
TP FP
    (2) 
 TPRecall
TP FN
    (3) 
 2* *_ Precision RecallF measure
Precision Recall
    (4) 
Here, precision is the percentage of malicious domains 
over the classified malicious ones. Recall evaluates how well 
an algorithm has correctly classified the malicious domains. 
To compare the effectiveness by synthesising precision and 
recall, F-measure calculates the harmonic average value of 
precision and recall. Accuracy is a measure of how well the 
model has correctly classified the domains. 
TABLE I.  THE CONFUSION MATRIX FOR WEBSITE CLASSIFICATION 
Actual Predicted Malicious Benign 
Malicious (Positive) TP (True Positive) FN (False Negative)
Benign (Negative) FP (False Positive) TN (True Negative)
C. Experimental Setups 
All experiments reported in this paper were executed in 
the R programming environment. The R packages ‘e1071’, 
‘nnet’, ‘class’, ‘RWeka’, ‘klaR’, ‘randomForest’, ‘gbm’ and 
‘adabag’ were applied to implement the machine learning 
algorithms. All of these packages are available from the 
Comprehensive R Archive Network repository 
(http://cran.r-project.org/). The BPSO-based feature 
selection technique was implemented in R by ourselves. 
Some adjustable parameters in each of the classifiers were 
tuned by maximising F-measure using 5-fold cross 
validation. Specifically, the tuned parameters include: SVM 
(RBF Kernel, gamma = 0.5, Cost = 8), ANN (size = 5, 
maxit = 2000), C4.5 (C = 0.05), KNN (K = 10), RF (ntree = 
1000), GBM (n.trees = 5000, distribution = ‘bernoulli’, 
n.minobsinnode = 10), Adaboost (mfinal = 100, maxdepth = 
3), bagging (mfinal = 100, maxdepth = 5). For the BPSO-
based feature selection technique, its swarm size was 30 and 
maximum iteration was 500. Both cognitive and interaction 
coefficients were set to 2.0. 
D. Experimental Results and Dicussion 
To identify the malware and phishing websites based on 
popularity and performance data, nine well-studied machine 
learning algorithms, which include five single models (i.e., 
SVM, ANN, KNN, C4.5 and Naïve Bayes) and four 
ensemble models (i.e., RF, GBM, Adaboost and bagging), 
were investigated. Cross validation was first applied for 
parameter tuning so that the optimal value of each parameter 
can be determined. Then, 10-fold cross validation with 
random permutation was done to estimate the performance of 
each classifier. Furthermore, the average performance and 
standard deviation were estimated by repeating the cross 
validation 10 times so as to reduce bias in the experiments.  
Table II and Table III report the performance of the nine 
classifiers on the Malware and combined MalwarePhishing 
datasets, respectively. As can be seen from Table II, among 
the five single models, four of them consistently perform 
well with the values of different metrics larger than 0.88. On 
the contrary, Bayes performs very badly in three of the 
metrics. Although Bayes gains the highest recall with the 
value of 0.9849, which means it can correctly identify 
malware and phishing websites with the highest percentage, 
it misclassifies a large number of benign domains as 
malicious ones in terms of accuracy and precision. From the 
viewpoint of F-measure, which is considerably the most 
important measure in a problem of this nature, the SVM has 
the highest value of 0.9123, followed by KNN (0.9113), 
ANN (0.9089) and C4.5 (0.9044). Moving to the ensemble 
models, RF performs the best with F-measure of 0.9393. 
Compared to the single models, the ensembles are 
consistently better across all four metrics, with an exception 
of bagging, which is slightly worse than the five single 
models in terms of recall. Similar results can be observed in 
Table III.  
From the above, it is clear that the ensemble approach 
that combines a number of weak learners could generate 
better performance. The four ensemble models considered in 
this study have all been formed by combining several weak 
learners. The superiority of ensemble models over single 
ones observed in this study is consistent with findings from 
past studies [37, 38]. Among the four ensemble models, RF, 
the GBM and Adaboost have a built-in feature selection 
process, which improves the performance further. Feature 
selection can identify a powerful predictive subset of 
variables by eliminating noisy, irrelevant and redundant 
inputs without degrading the performance of a model. It is 
thus often applied for single models. For a fairer comparison, 
we incorporated feature selection into the single models to 
see if their performance could be improved. 
Table IV and Table V show the results of feature 
selection based single models on the Malware and combined 
MalwarePhishing datasets, respectively. In comparison with 
the original single models, these feature selection based 
models have better performances. Especially for the Bayes 
approach, substantial improvement in performance (except 
F-measure) can be observed. Nevertheless, the feature 
selection based single models are still performing slightly 
worse than the ensembles. 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 illustrate the average rank of mean 
performance and standard deviation of performance of 
different classifiers on the two datasets. The average ranks 
were computed through the Friedman test. Based on the 
Friedman test, the model with the best performance is ranked 
as 1 while the worst model is ranked as 14 (there are 14 
models in total). From Fig. 2, we can clearly conclude that 
the ensemble models have lowest average ranks, followed by 
the feature selection based single models and finally the 
single models. 
 
 
TABLE II.  COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF SEVERAL CLASSIFIERS: 
THE MALWARE DATASET 
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure
Single 
SVM 0.9109 0.8945 0.9314 0.9123 
ANN 0.9076 0.8930 0.9261 0.9089 
KNN 0.9097 0.8925 0.9316 0.9113 
C4.5 0.9023 0.8813 0.9299 0.9044 
Bayes 0.7280 0.6505 0.9849 0.7830 
Ensemble
RF 0.9387 0.9293 0.9499 0.9393 
GBM 0.9356 0.9268 0.9457 0.9360 
Adaboost 0.9356 0.9294 0.9430 0.9359 
bagging 0.9150 0.9085 0.9224 0.9150 
TABLE III.  COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF SEVERAL CLASSIFIERS: 
THE MALWAREPHISHING DATASET 
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure
Single 
SVM 0.9155 0.9008 0.9344 0.9168 
ANN 0.9095 0.8985 0.9240 0.9104 
KNN 0.9145 0.8998 0.9332 0.9157 
C4.5 0.9086 0.8943 0.9278 0.9100 
Bayes 0.7478 0.6680 0.9856 0.7956 
Ensemble
RF 0.9425 0.9342 0.9525 0.9430 
GBM 0.9433 0.9340 0.9544 0.9438 
Adaboost 0.9396 0.9350 0.9456 0.9399 
bagging 0.9195 0.9130 0.9281 0.9200 
TABLE IV.  COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF FEATURE SELECTION 
BASED CLASSIFIERS: THE MALWARE DATASET 
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure
Feature 
selection 
SVM 0.9211 0.9005 0.9470 0.9229 
ANN 0.9153 0.9018 0.9325 0.9166 
KNN 0.9191 0.8976 0.9468 0.9212 
C4.5 0.9148 0.8935 0.9417 0.9165 
Bayes 0.8865 0.8605 0.9227 0.8901 
TABLE V.  COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF FEATURE SELECTION 
BASED CLASSIFIERS: THE MALWAREPHISHING DATASET 
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure
Feature 
selection 
SVM 0.9210 0.9150 0.9440 0.9300 
ANN 0.9135 0.8988 0.9331 0.9150 
KNN 0.9177 0.9004 0.9399 0.9193 
C4.5 0.9185 0.9103 0.9287 0.9187 
Bayes 0.8955 0.8738 0.9252 0.8982 
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Fig. 2. The average rank of mean performance of different classifiers over 
the two datasets 
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Fig. 3. The average rank of standard deviation of performance of different 
classifiers over the two datasets 
TABLE VI.  WILCOXON’S SIGNED-RANK TEST BETWEEN EACH PAIR OF CLASSIFIERS ON THE MALWARE DATASET (F-MEASURE) 
ANN KNN C4.5 Bayes RF GBM Adaboost bagging FS_SVM FS_ANN FS_KNN FS_C4.5 FS_Bayes
SVM 3.71E-02 4.92E-01 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 3.91E-03 1.95E-03 1.93E-01 1.37E-02 2.32E-01 1.95E-03
ANN 1.93E-01 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 3.91E-03 1.95E-03 4.92E-01 1.95E-03 6.25E-01 1.95E-03
KNN 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.37E-02 1.95E-03 6.25E-01 1.37E-02 4.92E-01 1.95E-03
C4.5 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 3.91E-03 1.95E-03 2.73E-02 1.95E-03
Bayes 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
RF 1.95E-03 1.95E-02 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
GBM 1.00E+00 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 5.89E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
Adaboost 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
bagging 1.05E-01 3.91E-03 8.46E-01 1.95E-02 1.95E-03
FS_SVM 1.95E-03 3.71E-02 9.77E-03 1.95E-03
FS_ANN 9.77E-03 1.00E+00 1.95E-03
FS_KNN 8.40E-02 1.95E-03
FS_C4.5 1.95E-03
TABLE VII.  WILCOXON’S SIGNED-RANK TEST BETWEEN EACH PAIR OF CLASSIFIERS ON THE MALWAREPHISHING DATASET (F-MEASURE) 
 ANN KNN C4.5 Bayes RF GBM Adaboost bagging FS_SVM FS_ANN FS_KNN FS_C4.5 FS_Bayes
SVM 5.86E-03 1.93E-01 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 4.32E-01 3.22E-01 1.95E-03
ANN  1.95E-03 8.46E-01 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 2.75E-01 1.95E-03 3.91E-03 1.95E-03
KNN   5.86E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.37E-02 2.32E-01 1.60E-01 1.95E-03
C4.5    1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.60E-01 3.91E-03 3.91E-03 1.95E-03
Bayes     1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
RF      2.60E-01 2.73E-02 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
GBM      9.77E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
Adaboost      1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
bagging      1.95E-03 1.95E-03 8.40E-02 2.32E-01 1.95E-03
FS_SVM      1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03 1.95E-03
FS_ANN       9.77E-03 1.95E-02 1.95E-03
FS_KNN        6.95E-01 1.95E-03
FS_C4.5        1.95E-03
  
To further verify the significance between 
performances of different classifiers, a non-parametric test 
- the Wilcoxon signed-rank test - was applied to examine 
the statistical differences between the results obtained by 
each of the classifiers. Table VI and Table VII show the p-
values of these statistical tests based on F-measure. In 
these tables, the p-values that are greater than the 
significant level (i.e., > 0.05) have been highlighted in 
bold. From the tables, we can conclude that: (1) in terms of 
F-measure on the two datasets, most of the pairwise 
classifiers are significantly different with only a small 
number of exceptions; (2) the ensemble models 
statistically outperform both single models and the feature 
selection based single models except that there are no 
statistical differences between bagging and FS_SVM as 
well as bagging and FS_KNN on the Malware dataset, and 
bagging and FS_KNN as well as bagging and FS_C4.5 on 
the MalwarePhishing dataset; and (3) by comparing the 
feature selection based single models and single models, 
except for ANN (on both datasets) and KNN (on the 
MalwarePhishing dataset), the feature selection process 
statistically improves the results of single models. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 In this paper, we have presented a study to investigate 
the performance of machine learning techniques for 
identifying malware and phishing web domains using 
online popularity and performance data. Sixteen data 
features that represent the popularity and performance of 
web domains were crawled, and nine well-known machine 
learning techniques, including both single and ensemble 
models, were examined. Experimental results show that 
the ensemble models significantly outperform those single 
models investigated. In addition, a BPSO based feature 
selection method was incorporated to the single models 
and the results show that it can effectively improve the 
performance of single models for malicious domain 
classification. This further indicates the feasibility of 
employing the widely available Internet data about web 
domains to accurately differentiate malicious web domains 
from benign ones. Unlike the existing methods that extract 
features from the content of malicious web domains and 
compare them with the benign ones’, our approach does 
not require this tedious process. Moreover, our proposed 
approach can identify the malicious web domains 
regardless of whether they perform phishing attacks or 
distribute malware, which is essential in real world settings 
where a malicious web domain can be a phishing site or 
would distribute malware, or both.  
 This study motivates future work in exploring the 
inclusion of more online data to improve the predictive 
performance of machine learning techniques. Besides that, 
imbalanced class distribution, a challenging problem in the 
area of malicious domain identification, should be 
addressed. Finally, an automated filter that can extract 
features and build identification models automatically will 
be investigated. 
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